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Interlocutory Appeal of Orders Granting or Denying Stays of 
Arbitration 
When parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause can-
not agree whether to arbitrate or litigate a dispute that arises be-
tween them, 1 the party favoring litigation may seek a court order 
staying arbitration.2 If he has already initiated a court action, he 
may ask the court to stay arbitration pending its resolution,3 regard-
less of whether arbitration proceedings have commenced. Alterna-
tively, a party receiving notice of the other's intention to arbitrate 
may request a stay in a court action brought solely for that purpose.4 
Since the court's order on a motion to stay determines whether 
the parties will initially litigate or arbitrate their dispute, 5 the order 
can substantially affect their interests. A court that grants a motion 
to stay deprives one party of his right to resolve contract disputes 
without the contentiousness, expense, and delay oflitigation.6 And a 
court that refuses to stay arbitration may deny the other party, at 
I. For a discussion of situations where a party might prefer litigation to arbitration,, see S. 
LAZARUS, J. BRAY, L. CARTER, K. COLLINS, B. GlEDT, R. HOLTON, P. MATTHEWS & G. WIL-
LARD, RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 39-40 (1965) [hereinafter cited ass. LAZARUS]: 
2. A motion to stay arbitration invokes the general equity powers of the court rather than a 
specific remedy under the Federal Arbitration Act. See Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. Triangle 
Aviation Serv., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1388, 1389-90 (S.D.N.Y.), qffd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir, 1974). 
For a general discussion of the enforceability of arbitration agreements in both state and 
federal courts, see Sonderby, Commercial Arbitration: Eeforcement of an Agreement to--Arbi-
lrate Future .Disputes, 5 J._ MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 72 (1971). 
3. For example, suppose that X and Y are parties to a contract containing an arbitration 
agreement. A dispute arises, and X commences proceedings under the arbitration clause. Y 
seeks relief on the contract in a court action and asks the court to stay arbitration pending 
completion of court proceedings. X pleads the arbitration agreement as a defense to rs court 
action and moves under § 3 of the Arbitration Act for a stay of court proceedings pending 
arbitration. Alternatively, X may present evidence of rs refusal to arbitrate and request the 
court to compel arbitration under§ 4 of the Act. This Note is concerned with the interlocutory 
appealability of the court's order on rs motion to stay arbitration. 
4. The court's order in an action brought solely to obtain a stay of arbitration constitutes a 
final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). An issue of interlocutory appealabil-
ity under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1976) does not arise in such cases unless the court grants or 
refuses a preliminary injunction against arbitration prior to rendering final judgment. Appeal 
under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 
(1949), will never be available in actions brought for the sole purpose of staying arbitration. 
See note 33 infra. · 
5. The initial determination of whether to arbitrate or litigate a dispute can also be made 
by two other kinds of orders. Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976), 
permits a court to stay its own proceedings pending arbitration. And § 4 of the Act gives 
courts the power to compel arbitration. This Note considers only the interlocutory appealabil-
ity of orders granting or refusing stays of arbitration. The rules governing the appealability of 
§ 3 orders are summarized at note 88 in.fro. 
6. See text at notes 53-64 in.fro. 
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least temporarily, his right to have the dispute adjudicated.7 To 
7. Motions to stay arbitration typically assert one or both of two principal grounds: (1) the 
arbitration clause in the contract fails to cover the matter in 'dispute, or is unenforceable; and 
(2) the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable because of statutory preemption or public 
policy. Aksen, What YouNeedto.KnowAboutArbitrationLaw-A Tria/ityofResearch, 10 
FORUM 793, 797 (1975). 
A party seeking to stay arbitration on contractual grounds may argue that the parties never 
agreed to arbitrate, that the arbitration agreement between the parties does not cover the dis-
pute in question, or that the opposing party has lost the right to arbitrate through conduct 
amounting to waiver, laches, or default. Arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act is a 
matter of contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), and a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a matter 
that he has not agreed to arbitrate. E.g., Hussey Metal Div. of Copper Range Co. v. Lec-
tromelt Furnace Div., McGraw-Edison Co., 471 F.2d 556, 557 (3d Cir. 1972); Lea Tai Textile 
Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc .• 411 F.Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Accordingly, the fed-
eral courts have power to stay arbitration ''where an agreement therefor is absent." American 
Broadcasting Cos. v. American Fedn. of Television & Radio Artists, 412 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
In evaluating a motion to stay arbitration on contractual grounds, the court will consider 
only matters specifically pertaining to the making or performance of the agreement to arbi-
trate. The enforceability of the contract embodying the parties' arbitration agreement, and the 
merits of the dispute arising under the contract, will not be considered. This rule is an applica-
tion of the doctrine of "separability'' adopted by the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Under the doctrine of separability, the en-
forceability of an arbitration agreement is not dependent upon the validity of the embodying 
contract. The arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable by circumstances making 
the rest of the contract unenforceable. See M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COM· 
MERCIAL ARBITRATION § 8.01 (1968). See generally, Note, Federal Arbitration Act and Applica-
tion of the "Separability .Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588. 
A party seeking to stay arbitration on public policy grounds will argue that the matters in 
dispute involve issues so important that a Judicial, rather than an arbitral, hearing is required. 
Courts and co=entators agree that arbitration is primarily adopted to settle ordinary busi-
ness disputes, and is unsuited to the resolution of important public questions: 
[Arbitration] is a remedy peculiarly suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes be-
tween merchants as to questions of fact - quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance 
with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance, and the like. It has a place also in 
the determination of the simpler questions of law. . . . It is not the proper method for 
deciding points oflaw of major importance involving constitutional questions or policy in 
the application of statutes. 
Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 281 (1926). See Zip 
Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 186 (D. Del. 1930). The Arbitration Act was passed 
largely at the insistence of co=ercial groups dissatisfied with the expense and delay attend-
ant to judicial resolution of everyday business disputes. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial 
.Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and R.R. 696 Before the Subcomms. of the Committees on 
the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings]; Committee on 
Co=erce, Trade and Co=ercial Law, The United States Arbitration Act and its Application, 
11 A.B.AJ. 153, 153 (1925). 
The courts have most often stayed arbitration on public policy grounds in suits involving 
patents, see, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Public Serv. Co. oflndiana, 
193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 
F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
913 (1975). See generally Dobkin, Arbitrability of Patent .Disputes Under the U.S. Arbitration 
Act, 23 ARB. J. I (1968). A similar response has been co=on in cases involving securities, 
see, e.g., Sennett v. Oppenheimer & Co., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 97,378 (N.D. ill. 1980); Starkman v. Seroussi, 377 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 
Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and antitrust violations, see, e.g., A. & E. 
Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 39_6 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. 
Supp. IO (S.D.N.Y. 1971), ajfd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); 
Cofinco Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co. [1974-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 98,502 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). There 
is, however, no universal rule proscribing arbitration of all securities disputes. In many situa-
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avoid these consequences, parties may seek interlocutory review8 of 
district court orders granting or refusing stays of arbitration. 
Three conflicting responses to such requests have emerged in the 
courts of appeals.9 Some courts permit interlocutory appeals of both 
grants and denials of stays, one reviews only grants, and another 
takes interlocutory appeals of neither grants nor denials. 10 This 
Note attempts to resolve the conflict among the courts of appeals by 
examining the interests affected by orders granting and denying stays 
of arbitration. Part I considers the appealability of such orders 
under the collateral order doctrine developed by the Supreme Court 
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 11 This doctrine permits 
interlocutory appeal of final orders adjudicating an important right 
that is collateral to the merits of the case and effectively unreview-
able in a final judgment appeal. Part II considers whether orders on 
motions for stays of arbitration are reviewable as orders granting or 
refusing injunctions under section 1292(a)(l) of the Judicial Code.12 
Both Parts conclude that orders staying arbitration are immediately 
appealable, 13 but that courts should reject interlocutory appeals of 
orders refusing stays. 
I 
The fundamental limitation upon federal appellate jurisdiction is 
the concept of "finality." The final judgment rule, currently embod-
ied in section 1291 of the Judicial Code,14 permits appeal only from 
tions, securities disputes are arbitrable. See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3932-36 (2d 
ed. Supp. 1969). And there are situations in which arbitration of antitrust claims is permissi-
ble. See generally, Annot., 3 A.L.R. FED. 918 (1970). 
Less frequently, courts grant stays of arbitration on purely procedural grounds. A court 
may stay arbitration, pending litigation, if the matters to be arbitrated depend upon issues 
before the court, see Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Boeing-Vertol Co., 478 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. 
La.), '!lfd per curiam, 606 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1979), or if the court's determination of the liti-
gated claim has a definite bearing on the outcome of the arbitration proceedings, see Stockwell 
v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). A stay of arbitration in these situations 
eliminates the possibility of inconsistent fact-finding between court and arbitrator. 
8. An interlocutory appeal is one that is "not determinable of the controversy, but which is 
necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLAcK.'s LAW DICTIONARY 731 (5th ed. 
1979). 
9. See text at notes 78-80 i'!fra. 
10. See note 78 i'!fra. 
11. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1976) states: 
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: 
(I) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United States 
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the 
District Court of the Vir~ Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting, continuini, modi-
fying, refusing or dissolving injuntions, or refusing to dissolve or momfy injunctions, ex-
cept where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. . . . 
13. To the extent that a right of appeal is recognized under§ 1292(a)(l), the issue of ap-
pealability under the collateral order doctrine becomes irrelevant. See note 76 i'!fra. 
14. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) reads: 
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a decision that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
for the court to do but execute the judgment."15 Underlying the rule 
is the sound conclusion that immediate review of every order ulti-
mately subject to reversal would waste judicial resources. Interlocu-
tory appeals increase litigants' costs, burden an already "sorely 
overworked judiciary,"16 and may delay the litigation.17 Such ap-
peals are particularly wasteful where a continuation of the trial pro-
ceedings might render the challenged order immaterial.18 
"[O]verly rigid insistence upon a 'final decision' for appeal,"19 
however, may seriously and needlessly injure the litigants. Without 
interlocutory review, rights for which the court of appeals can fash-
ion no adequate remedy in a final judgment appeal may be lost.20 
The policies implicated by the final judgment rule thus require that a 
balance be struck between judicial efficiency and justice in individ-
ual cases.21 Congress and the Supreme Court have struck this bal-
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the 
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the 
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. 
15. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). Leading Supreme Court decisions 
discussing the role of the final judgment rule in the federal system include Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 
(1948); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 123-25 (1945); and Cobbledick v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). See also McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891). The 
histoxy of the final judgment rule is discussed in Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for 
Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 (1932). 
16. Note, Appellate Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 
525 (1972). 
17. Interlocutoxy appeal does not necessarily delay litigation. See note 65 i,!fra. 
18. Rulings may become moot in a number of ways. The trial judge himself may reverse 
the ruling. The parties may settle, or the party seeking to appeal may win the case at trial. The 
ruling may have no impact to require reversal. Denying interlocutoxy review of orders which 
later become moot saves the time of the appellate court and smooths proceedings at trial. See 
15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 3907, at 431 
(1976). 
A number of other considerations support the final judgment rule. The court of appeals can 
appraise important issues on the basis of a full rather than a partial record. The rule helps to 
avoid the loss of evidence which could result from repeated interruptions of the trial process. It 
also prevents the party with greater resources from harassing his opponent with repeated inter-
locutoxy appeals. See 9 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE f 110.07 (2d ed. 1980); 15 C. WRIGHT, 
A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra, at § 3907. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 
449 U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981). 
19. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 746 (1976). 
20. See, eg., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1981) (district court's 
refusal to enter consent decree providing for injunctive relief against employer could result in 
serious, perhaps irreparable injuxy to plaintiffs through lost job opportunities and training); 
Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1966) (en bane): 
If the grant or denial of a preliminaxy injunction was reviewable only after a "final deci-
sion" had been entered below it would frequently be too late for the courts of appeals to 
undo the harm caused by an erroneous ruling below and recreate a state of affairs in 
which meaningful relief could be granted to the party entitled to prevail. 
21. Among ''the considerations that always compete in the question of appealability, the 
most important . . . are the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review on the one hand and 
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ance by creating statutory22 and judicial exceptions that authorize 
appeal of certain interlocutory orders. Where failure to review the 
trial court's order immediately could irreparably injure either 
party,23 courts may take interlocutory appeals under the judicially 
created collateral order doctrine. 
The Supreme Court outlined the collateral order doctrine in Co-
hen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. ,24 which involved a share-
holder's derivative action brought in diversity jurisdiction. The 
defendant demanded that the plaintiff post bond under a statute that 
made unsuccessful derivative plaintiffs liable for expenses and attor-
neys' fees.25 The district court denied the defendant's motion, and 
held that the statute did not apply in diversity actions. The court of 
appeals reversed,26 and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Before 
addressing the merits, the Court held that the order denying the re-
quest for security was appealable as a final decision, although the 
case itself had not been concluded. The order, said the Court, fell 
within a "small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of 
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, 
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause 
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the 
the danger of denying justice by delay on the other." Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion 
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). 
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1976), discussed in Part II infra. 
23. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (district court order denying 
defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable because 
delayed review could result in irretrievable loss of defendant's rights under the double jeop-
ardy clause). 
24. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Because stay orders are cast in injunctive terms, courts generally 
consider the appealability of an order staying or refusing to stay proceedings to be governed by 
§ 1292(a)(l). But at least two circuits have permitted appeal under Cohen of orders staying 
trial proceedings pending administrative determinations. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 539 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1976); Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 
1976); CAB v. Aeromatic Travel Corp., 489 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1973). 
The converse of an arbitration stay order, an order entered under § 3 of the Arbitration Act 
staying or refusing to stay trial proceedings pending arbitration, cannot be appealed as a col-
lateral order. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 179 (1955), where the 
Supreme Court stated that a district court order refusing a § 3 stay "could not be called a final 
decision under§ 1291." Accord, New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 
F.2d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 1972) (grant of§ 3 stay); Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 427 F.2d 528,529 (10th 
Cir. 1970) (grant); Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304,306 (2d Cir. 
1967) (grant). See also Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S. 
449, 451 (1935) (district court order denying a stay under§ 3 of the Arbitration Act is not a 
final judgment). Baltimore Contractors and subsequent court of appeals decisions have estab-
lished that§ 3 orders are appealable, if at all, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) and not as collat-
eral orders. The same rule, however, is not applicable to arbitration stay orders. Baltimore 
Contractors' construction of§ 1292(a)(l) relative to§ 3 orders is not binding upon the court of 
appeals in arbitration stay order cases. See Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 483 
(3d Cir. 1975). Similarly, courts' application of§ 1291 to § 3 orders should not control the 
appealability of arbitration stay orders as collateral orders. 
25. 337 U.S. at 543-45. 
26. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Cohen, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948), reversing 1 F.R.D. 
352 (D.NJ. 1947). 
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whole case is adjudicated."27 
Implicit in this conclusion are four prerequisites to applying the 
Cohen doctrine.28 First, the order must be collateral to, or separable 
from, the merits of the case before the trial court.29 Second, the or-
der must constitute the trial court's final disposition of the matter in 
question, and cannot be "tentative, informal or incomplete."30 
Third, the order must involve an "important" right, and not simply a 
minor exercise of the trial court's discretion.3 I Finally, there must be 
a risk that the appellant will irretrievably lose a substantive right if 
the court denies interlocutory appeal.32 When made in the course of 
an ongoing proceeding,33 a motion to stay arbitration is collateral to 
the merits because it can be adjudicated without reference to the un-
derlying contract dispute.34 And since the district court's order on a 
motion to stay constitutes its last word on the availability of the relief 
requested, the order is "final."35 The interlocutory appealability of 
orders granting or denying stays of arbitration, therefore, turns on 
27. 337 U.S. at 546. 
28. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3911, at 470-72; 9 
J. MooRE, supra note 18, f 110.10, at 133. The Supreme Court's most recent formulations of 
the Cohen requirements are found in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 
374-75 (1981), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See note 36 infra. 
29. 337 U.S. at 546. 
30. 337 U.S. at 546. 
31. 337 U.S. at 546. Cohen says that the right must be ''too important" to be denied review; 
the opinion does not talk in terms of trial court discretion. 
32. 337 U.S. at 546. 
33. The court's order in an action brought for the sole purpose of staying arbitration will 
not be appealable under Cohen. The order in this situation disposes of the principal issue of 
the case and hence is not collateral to the merits. However, unless cast in preliminary terms, 
the order will be appealable as a final decision under§ 1291. 
34. See Justice Black's dissent in Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 
185 (1955) ("[C]ertainly decision of whether a judicial rather than an arbitration tribunal shall 
hear and determine this accounting controversy is logically and practically severable from the 
factual and legal issues crucial to determination of the merits of the controversy."); Local 771, 
Intl. Alliance of Theatrical State Employees v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 1107, 1112 (2d Cir. 
1977) (labor arbitration) (''The interpretation of the arbitration provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement presents an issue that is separable from and collateral to the main issue 
in the case, which is whether the employees who are members of Local 771 are entitled to be 
assigned to newsgathering and editing functions . . ."). A claim that a dispute is nonarbitrable 
for reasons of public policy, however, may require the court to examine the facts of the case. In 
cases of this kind the requirement that the order be collateral to the merits may not be satisfied. 
Cf. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,469 (1978) (order denying class certification 
is not collateral to the merits because it is "enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising 
the plaintiifs cause of action") (quoting Mercantile Natl. Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555,558 
(1963)). 
35. Although the district court retains power to reverse an order once entered, in most 
cases an order on a motion to stay will not be reconsidered. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & 
E. CooPER,supra note 18, § 3911, at 470: ''The bare fact that the court has power to change its 
ruling, however, does not preclude review. It is enough that no further consideration is con-
templated." Accord, In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 
1106, 1118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). 
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whether the appellant satisfies the last two requirements of the col-
lateral order doctrine. 
Conflicting judicial interpretations of the importance require-
ment make it difficult to predict whether a particular right is "impor-
tant."36 The paucity of litigation testing the appealability of orders 
granting or denying stays of arbitration further confounds analysis. 
Some courts permit appeal only of questions of general significance, 
the resolution of which ''will settle the matter not simply for the case 
in hand, but for many others."37 Other courts, interpreting the re-
quirement less restrictively, deny appeal only of orders clearly within 
the trial court's discretion.38 In circuits that take the more restrictive 
approach, routine interlocutory orders, such as stays of arbitration, 
may not be appealable under Cohen because they do not present an 
issue of broad significance. Courts that interpret the importance re-
quirement liberally, however, will usually find it satisfied by orders 
staying arbitration.39 
If he satisfies Cohen's importance requirement, an appellant 
seeking review of an order granting or denying a stay of arbitration 
must demonstrate that he will be irreparably injured absent an im-
mediate appeal. Irreparable injury would result from a ruling that 
denies a substantive right and could not be corrected on a final judg-
ment appeal.40 No court of appeals has yet considered the applica-
36. The two most recent Supreme Court decisions applying the Cohen collateral order doc-
trine shed little light on the proper interpretation of this requirement. In Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), the Court stated that to be appealable under Cohen, "the 
order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from 
a final judgment." Accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981). 
In neither of these cases did the Supreme Court indicate what factors make an interlocutory 
order sufficiently important to be appealable under Cohen. Instead, the Court's holding in 
both cases was grounded in other elements of the Cohen doctrine. The courts of appeal thus 
remain free to interpret the word ''important" largely as they see fit. 
37. Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935,937 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit still 
adheres to a strict interpretation of the "importance" requirement. See Armstrong v. 
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,439 & n.11 (2d'Cir. 1980). A number ofother courts of appeals restrict 
the availability of appeals under the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust Litigation, 611 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1980); Weit v. Continental Ill. Bank & 
Trust Co., 535 F.2d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1976); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595, 597-98 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975). 
38. United States v. Wilshire Apts., Inc., 590 F.2d 876, 883 n.5 (10th Cir. 1979). See also In 
re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64, 67 (8th Cir. 1976) (order of special 
importance to the parties is appealable even if it does not present any issue of general 
significance). 
39. This Nqte does not take a position on whether appeal under Cohen should be restricted 
to orders of general significance. It only argues that if appealability is not restricted, orders 
granting stays of arbitration will frequently qualify as appealable collateral orders. Because 
importance is irrelevant to the statutory analysis in Part II, however, even courts that interpret 
the collateral order doctrine narrowly should reach the result suggested by this Note. 
40. Comment, Co/lateral Orders and Extraordinary Writs as Exceptions to the Finality Rule, 
51 Nw. U. L. REv. 746, 750 (1957): 
An erroneous interlocutory order does not cause irreparable injury simply because it may 
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bility of the collateral order doctrine to an order granting a stay of 
arbitration,41 but two have held that a trial court's inappropriate de-
nial of a stay of arbitration does not cause irreparable injury.42 This 
Note, therefore, considers a pair of Supreme Court cases that discuss 
the irreparable injury requirement. These cases illustrate that a trial 
court order threatens to do irreparable injury only if its effects upon 
a substantive right cannot be corrected in a final judgment appeal. 
Cohen itself provides a good starting point. Underlying the 
bondposting statute at issue in that case was a fear that plaintiffs' 
personal resources might be insufficient to cover defendants' ex-
penses. Allowing the plaintiff to proceed without posting bond, said 
the Court, had a potentially irreparable impact on the defendant's 
ability to obtain reimbursement for its litigation expenses.43 A dec-
laration in a final judgment appeal that the district court should have 
required the plaintiff to post bond could not restore the defendant's 
right to guaranteed reimbursement. Only immediate appellate re-
view, the Court concluded, could avoid the irreparable injury that an 
erroneous trial court ruling might cause. 
One year after Cohen, in Swtft & Co. Packers v. Compania Colom-
cause the parties to suffer unnecessary expense or inconvenience. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. 
GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1978); Giordano v. Roudebush, 565 F.2d 1015, 
1018 (8th Cir. 1977); United States Tour Operators Assn. v. Trans World Air Lines, Inc., 556 
F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1977). Suppose, for example, that the district court erroneously denies 
the defendant's motion to dismiss. This order, unless immediately reviewed and reversed, will 
put the parties to the expense and inconvenience of obtaining a judgment that will be reversed 
upon appeal. Nonetheless, interlocutory appeal may not be taken of the denial of a motion to 
dismiss. See, eg., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 236 (1945); EEOC v. American Ex-
press Co., 558 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1977); Papilsky v. Berndt, 503 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974). Permitting interlocutory appeal of every erroneous trial court 
order would destroy the final judgment rule. When Congress codified the final judgment rule, 
it recognized that parties would sometimes be required to engage in purposeless proceedings 
before being allowed a right of appeal. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 30 
(1943). In consequence, courts faced with petitions for interlocutory appeal generally agree 
that "[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute 
irreparable injury." Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. I, 24 (1974). 
41. The Second Circuit has stated, however, that an order granting a stay of arbitration 
cannot be appealed under§ 1291. Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 
975, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Lu=us Co. v. Co=onwealth Oil Ref. 
Co., 297 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
42. New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 185 (1st Cir. 1972); 
Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 442 F.2d 1100, 1102 (2d Cir. 1970). 
In New England Power Co., the First Circuit stated that an order denying a stay of arbitra-
tion does not result in an irreparable loss, but only the loss of the "right" to stay arbitration. 
456 F.2d at 185. The court reasoned that the denial of a stay did not foreclose judicial deter-
mination of the appellant's claim ofnonarbitrability. 456 F.2d at 185. In Greater Continental 
Corp., the Second Circuit held that an order denying a stay of arbitration is not appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine. "[S]ince arbitration findings are reviewable and not en-
forceable until confirmed," said the court, ". . . this order does not finally determine any issue 
which would foreclose Continental from any substantive right unless reviewed now." 422 F.2d 
at 1102. 
43. See 337 U.S. at 546. 
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biana .Del Caribe,44 the Court permitted interlocutory appeal of a 
lower court order vacating the attachment of a vessel that was being 
held pending the outcome of a suit. Because the vessel apparently 
provided the only means of satisfying a judgment for the plaintiff, 
the order could cause irreparable injury by defeating its ability to 
recover from the defendant. The Court held the order appealable 
under Cohen because a final judgment review "would be an empty 
rite after the vessel had been released and the restoration of the at-
tachment [was] only theoretically possible."45 It suggested, however, 
that an order upholding an attachment might not be immediately 
appealable.46 This distinction seems sound. The attachment could 
be vacated upon the entry of a final judgment for the defendant or 
upon a final judgment appeal of a decision for the plaintiff, and, 
therefore, would not cause irreparable injury.47 
Tested against the principles developed in these cases, orders 
granting or denying stays of arbitration appear, upon first considera-
tion, unlikely to satisfy the irreparable injury requirement. If a stay 
is improperly granted, the party seeking arbitration can litigate the 
claim to final judgment, take a final judgment appeal, and obtain an 
order from the court of appeals vacating the judgment below and 
ordering arbitration. If a stay is improperly denied, the party seek-
ing to litigate can urge error in subsequent proceedings to enforce 
the arbitration award,48 or in a final judgment appeal from an order 
44. 339 U.S. 684 (1950). 
45. 339 U.S. at 689. 
46. After holding the order vacating the attachment to be appealable, the Court stated: 
"The situation is quite different where an attachment is upheld pending determination of the 
principle claim . . . . In such a situation the rights of all the parties can be adequately pro-
tected while the litigation on the main claim proceeds." 339 U.S. at 684. 
47. Thus it is commonly held that an interlocutory order denying a writ of attachment, 
sequestration, or replevin, or vacating a previously issued order, is appealable under Cohen. 
See, e.g., Lowe v. Pate Stevedoring Co., 595 F.2d 256, 257 (5th Cir. 1979); American Oil Co. v. 
McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 1970). An order granting a writ, or refusing to 
vacate an existing order, however, may not be appealed. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of 
Pearce, 498 F.2d 847, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1974); Financial Servs., Inc. v. Ferrandina, 474 F.2d 743 
(2d Cir. 1973). See also 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3911, at 
491-94. 
48. Although there is voluntary compliance with the arbitration award in approximately 
90% of the cases, M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 94 (1965), an award is not enforcea-
ble against a recalcitrant party unless confirmed by a court. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act 
authorizes the district court to enter judgment upon an arbitration award unless the award is 
vacated under§ 10, or corrected or modified under§ I I. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). Section 10 
allows the court to vacate the award if the arbitrators "exceeded their powers." See 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10 (1976). Because arbitrators derive their authority from the parties' arbitration agreement, 
they exceed their powers if they decide matters outside the scope of the agreement. See, e.g., 
J.P. Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros. Constr. Co., 374 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 847 (1967). It follows, then, that a party who seeks but is denied a stay of arbitration 
on contractual or public policy grounds can urge those same grounds as reason to vacate the 
arbitration award under§ 10. The party can seek a§ IO order either in an independent action 
or in opposition to § 9 proceedings brought by the other party. Since interlocutory orders are 
not res judicata, see G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfi.eld, 241 U.S. 22, 28 (1916); Sterling Drug, 
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confirming the award.49 , The district court's order on a motion to 
stay arbitration does not preclude either party from litigating or arbi-
trating his claim.50 Instead, the court of appeals has the power, in a 
final judgment appeal, to order arbitration or litigation where either 
has been erroneously denied.51 Erroneous orders granting or deny-
ing stays will, of course, subject the parties to needless trial or arbi-
tration proceedings. But most courts consider the time and expense 
of participating in purposeless proceedings insufficient justification 
for appeal of an interlocutory order.52 
Closer examination of the reasons that parties enter arbitration 
agreements, however, belies this initial observation and supports a 
distinction between grants and denials of stays. Although its propo-
nents believe that arbitration offers a legion of advantages over liti-
gation, 53 no single advantage is more important to most contracting 
parties than the speed with which proceedings can be concluded.54 
Inc. v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1975); McDonnell v. United States, 455 F.2d 
91, 96-97 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 942 (1973); United States v. Stonehill, 420 F. 
Supp. 46, 52 (C.D. Cal. 1976), the trial court's original conclusion that the dispute was arbitra-
ble will not be binding upon either it or any other court in which confirmation is sought. If, 
however, judgment is entered upon the award, a final judgment apeeal may be taken under 
§ 1291. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that a party unwillingly sent to arbitration 
(or litigation) may be satisfied with the results and never appeal. 
49. See note 48 supra and Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 
1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[I]f a decision to ... deny a stay of arbitration has a prejudicial 
effect on the rights of a party, that decision may be appealed after a final order has issued."), 
50. Similarly, an order entered under § 3 of the Arbitration Act staying judicial proceed-
ings pending arbitration does not conclusively preclude litigation of the dispute. As in the case 
where a stay of arbitration is denied, the stay can be urged as error in § 9 proceedings to 
confirm the arbitration award or in a§ 1291 appeal of the judgment entered on the award. It 
has thus been stated that a § 3 stay does not constitute a "final determination" of any of the 
parties' rights. Hussain v. Bache & Co., 562 F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
51. See generally New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 186 
(1st Cir. 1972); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
52. See note 40 supra. 
53. Among the advantages often attributed to arbitration are (1) inexpensiveness; (2) the 
use of business experts to resolve questions of business fact and trade usage; (3) an ability to 
provide a "friendlier'' forum than litigation; ( 4) less strict adherence to technical rules of evi-
dence; and (5) avoidance of the publicity that may attend court proceedings. See S. LAZARUS, 
supra note 1, at 47-56; Note, Restraining Effects of the Final Judgment Rule on the Arbitration 
Process, 66 YALE LJ. 293,293 n.2 (1956); See also Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana 
Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); M. DOMKE, supra note 7, at§ 1.02. 
54. Business disputes disrupt the smooth operation of a concern and divert resources from 
their most efficient uses. Businessmen therefore attempt to settle most disputes as expedi-
tiously as possible. S. LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 65. Ninety percent of the businessmen re-
sponding to one survey considered speed to be an important positive attribute of arbitration. 
Id at 46. Parties may consider other attributes of arbitration equally important. See, e.g., 
Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, supra note 7, at 155-56, stating that 
arbitration is directed at the three evils of delay, expense, and the inability of the courts to 
reach results consistent with business standards. In fact, to some parties, speed may be of 
secondary importance. See Association of the Bar of City of New York, Report, in SELECTED 
ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 13 (D. Bloomfield ed. 1927), stating that the "chief 
argument" for arbitration lies in the submission of business disputes to persons knowledgeable 
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Parties arbitrate largely because they wish to resolve disputes expedi-
tiously.55 Litigation may take years to resolve, but commercial arbi-
tration proceedings, from their inception to the rendering of a final 
award, seldom last more than sixty to ninety days. 56 The time saved 
reduces the likelihood that the debtor will become insolvent by the 
time an award is rendered, and minimizes the time that businessmen 
must spend resolving disputes.57 This suggests that the parties to a 
valid arbitration agreement have, between themselves, a substantive 
contractual right to resolve disputes quickly and inexpensively. To 
protect this right, courts should permit immediate appeal of orders 
that threaten significantly to delay parties in the exercise of an arbi-
tration agreement. 
An order staying arbitration, if not reviewed immediately, will 
significantly delay arbitration. The order forces the party seeking 
arbitration to proceed with a potentially lengthy trial, and, if dissatis-
fied with the results, to take a final judgment appeal. By the time 
that the court of appeals overturns the district court's stay and orders 
arbitration, the value of the right to arbitrate will have been substan-
tially impaired.58 Because the delay and expense of litigation dimin-
ish the subsequent value of arbitration,59 a final judgment appeal 
cannot correct the damage caused by an erroneous order staying 
arbitration. · 
in the trade. This Note stresses the importance of speedy resolution of disputes because, unlike 
some other advantages of arbitration, this advantage will be irretrievably lost if orders granting 
stays are held unappealable. 
55. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924): "[T]here is so much agita-
tion against the costliness and delay of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by 
agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."; 66 
CoNG. REC. 984 (1924) (remarks of Sen. Walsh): 'The business interests of the country find so 
much delay attending the trial of lawsuits in courts that there is a very general demand for a 
revision of the law in this regard."; Joint Hearings, supra note 7, at 26 (statement of Alexander 
Rose). 
The federal courts have recognized that the "basic purpose" of commercial arbitration is 
the speedy resolution of disputes without the expense and delay of extended court proceedings. 
See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitration Assn., 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 
1973); Office of Supply, Govt. of the Republic of Korea v. New York Nav. Co., 469 F.2d 377, 
379 (2d Cir. 1972); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Intl. Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 
1967). The motivation behind most arbitration agreements is the parties' desire to resolve their 
disputes quickly and inexpensively. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 
U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (''The unmistakably clear congressional purpose [is] that the arbitration 
procedure . . . be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts."); United 
Aircraft Intl, Inc. v. Greenlandair, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.C. Conn.), qffd per 
curiam, 410 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1969). 
56. See M. DOMKE, supra note 48, at 8-9; S. LAZARUS, supra note I, at 48. 
57. M. DOMKE, supra note 48, at 8-9. 
58. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text. 
59. Many of the advantages of arbitration (i.e., submission of disputes to persons knowl-
edgeable in the trade and informal rules of evidence) are not lost if arbitration is delayed. 
Nonappealability, therefore, would not in all cases render the right to arbitrate totally worth-
less. But because arbitrating parties place great emphasis on avoiding expense and delay, 
nonappealability would often have precisely that effect. 
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The threat of irreparable injury60 posed by such orders, however, 
can be avoided by permitting interlocutory appeal under the collat-
eral order doctrine.61 Parties to a valid arbitration agreement have 
contractually established a right to resolve their disputes quickly and 
expeditiously.62 To protect that right, courts should permit immedi-
ate appeal of stays of arbitration, stays which threaten to destroy the 
very purpose for which the parties entered into the agreement. 63 A 
rule of immediate appealability thus helps to guarantee that parties 
realize the objectives of their contracts. In so doing, the rule would 
also further the judicial policy of encouraging the use of 
arbitration. 64 
60. At least one court has recognized that a party to an arbitration agreement suffers irrep-
arable injury within the meaning of Cohen if it is erroneously put to the expense and delay of 
litigation. Local 771, Intl. Alliance of Theatrical State Employees v. RKO Gen., Inc., 546 F.2d 
1107, 1112 (2d Cir. 1977) (held that in a labor arbitration, an order ruling the parties' arbitra-
tion agreement to be nonexclusive and permitting litigation to proceed could be appealed un-
der Cohen). 
61. The median time for the disposition of a normal civil case terminated by trial was 18 
months in fiscal year 1976-1977. [1977] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ANN. 
REP. 337. The total elapsed time from the initiation of an arbitration proceeding to award is 
approximately 60 to 90 days. See note 56 supra. The median time from the filing of a com-
plete record to the final disposition of a civil case submitted to the federal courts of appeals in 
1976-1977 was 7.7 months. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ANN. REP,, supra, 
at 309. Therefore, where appeal is allowed from an order staying arbitration and the appellate 
court finds the order erroneous, the total proceeding from initiation of the motion to stay 
arbitration through the appeal and subsequent arbitration will be somewhat over 10 months. 
If appeal is not allowed, an additional 18 months will be spent in trial proceedings. Holding 
orders granting stays to be unappealable, therefore, would more than double the time parties 
must spend resolving their dispute. Where an order denying a stay is unappealable and erro-
neous, the loss of time will amount to the two months or so spent in the arbitration 
proceedings. 
62. "An appellant who seeks arbitration has gained his right not to have to suffer the costs 
and delays of trial through contract negotiations." United States Tour Operators Assn. v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 556 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1977). In U.S. Tour Operators, the court 
dismissed the defendant's appeal from an order denying its motion for a stay of trial proceed-
ings on grounds of primary administrative jurisdiction. The court stated that the defendant, 
unlike a party to an arbitration agreement, had not bargained to have its case heard in a 
different forum and hence had "no ... contractual right" to avoid trial proceedings. 556 F.2d 
at 130. 
63. It is arguable that any recourse to the courts, even to appeal an order staying arbitra-
tion, is inconsistent with the policies behind arbitration. One commentator stated: 
A handicap is imposed on commercial arbitration when the parties resort to the courts 
either before or during and after the arbitration. Here the various advanta~es of arbitra-
tion - speed, economy, and privacy - are lost when the validity of the arbitration clause 
and its binding effect is tested in court, when the arbitrability of the issue is challen~ed, 
when the qualification of an arbitrator is questioned, and when these court determinations 
may be further a_ppealed in lengthy and expensive court proceedings. This resort to court 
action also elimfiiates the friendliness in the parties' relations whlch arbitration tries to 
maintain. 
M. DOMKE, supra note 48, at 15. The policies of arbitration would be thwarted to a greater 
extent, however, by a rule denying interlocutory appeal of orders granting stays. If the order 
was erroneous, interlocutory appeal will return the dispute to arbitration in the shortest time 
possible, and enable the parties to avoid a trial and final judgment appeal. 
64. While the historical underpinnings of the position are subject to question, see Note, 
Incorporation ef State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 MICH. L. REV, 1391, 1403-04 
(1980), the federal judiciary is now firmly of the belief that federal policy favors arbitration. 
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An order denying a stay of arbitration, in contrast, does not 
threaten irreparable harm. Because the order permits arbitration to 
proceed without delay,65 it does not impair the rights of the party 
who wishes to arbitrate. The party who wishes to litigate may suffer 
the expense and inconvenience of a needless arbitration proceeding, 
but this injury is not irreparable. A party seeking to litigate, unlike 
one seeking to arbitrate, is not claiming a contractual right to quick 
resolution of his disputes. An order denying a stay, therefore, does 
not impair the value of any contractual right. A dispute erroneously 
sent to arbitration, moreover, can be returned to litigation in a rela-
tively short time.66 For these reasons, orders denying stays do not 
threaten the irreparable injury that is a prerequisite to .interlocutory 
appealability under Cohen.67 
See, e.g., Becker Autoradio, U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 44-45 
(3d Cir. 1978); Seaboard Coast Line Ry. v. National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d"657, 660 
(5th Cir. 1977); Hanes Crop. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Aerojet-General 
Corp. v. American Arbitration Assn., 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973); J.S. & H. Constr. Co. 
v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1973); Butler Prods. Co. v. 
Unistrut Corp., 367 F.2d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 1966). The courts have not, however, always 
viewed arbitration with favor. At common law, agreements to arbitrate future disputes were 
not enforceable. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974); Simpson, 
Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 160, 160-64 (1934). For .a 
comprehensive discussion of the judiciary's previous hostility toward arbitration and the 
change in attitude effected by passage of the Arbitration Act, see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. 
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942). 
65. However, if an order denying a stay is held appealable, the trial court may exercise its 
authority under Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to stay arbitration during 
the pendency of the appeal. Arbitration might also be stayed by the court of appeals under 
rule 62(g), or by either court under ·ru1e 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Because an appeal from an order denying a stay is unlikely to be decided before arbitration is 
completed, the trial court may well grant the stay to save ·the parties the expense of a possibly 
needless arbitration proceeding. In light of the federal policy favoring the use of arbitration as 
a quick and inexpensive means of resolving disputes, the possibility that arbitration_ will be 
stayed during the pendency of an appeal from the denial of a stay is another factor supporting 
a rule ofnonappealability. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 F.2d 1244, 
1249 (8th Cir. 1981) (restricting interlocutory review of orders that permit arbitration to pro-
ceed will "afford parties to arbitration agreements fewer opportunities to delay or forestall 
arbitration proceedings, thus ensuring that arbitration remains a rapid and efficient means to 
resolve disputes."). 
Permitting interlocutory appeal of orders granting stays will not necessarily delay trial pro-
ceedings. District courts have authority to proceed with other aspects of the case during the 
pendency of an appeal under.§ 1292(a)(l). See, e.g., DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. 
Co., 374 F.2d 50, 51 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Nalco Chem. Co. v. Hall, . 
347 F.2d 90, 92 (5th Cir. 1965); Janousek v. Doyle, 313 F.2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1963). Al-
though there is little authority on the subject, there is no reason to apply a different rule to 
collateral order appeals. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 18, § 3911, 
at 497. 
66. See note 61 supra. 
67. In 1958, nine years after the decision in Cohen, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): 
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under 
this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law 
as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate 
appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, 
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its 
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order . . . . 
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Cohen's irreparable harm requirement, therefore, enables courts 
to distinguish between orders granting and denying stays of arbitra-
tion. 68 Courts applying the collateral order doctrine should permit 
immediate appeal of orders staying arbitration, but not of orders re-
fusing stays.69 '.fhis suggested approach adequately protects the in-
terests of both the parties and the judicial system. 70 The proposed 
Some courts believe that the collateral order doctrine should be narrowly construed because of 
the availability of§ 1292(b) review. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 439 n.12 
(2d Cir. 1980); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543 (3d Cir. 1977). These cases 
argue that the judicial system is best served by a general rule of nonappealability and that 
§ 1292(b) may be invoked in the exceptional case where interlocutory appeal is merited. See 9 
J. MOORE, supra note 18, ~ 110.10. 
Section 1292(b) would not often allow the interlocutory appeal of arbitration stay orders 
because it permits certification of questions of law, while many arbitration stay orders turn on 
questions of fact. Even where the stay order involves a question of law, it is unlikely to con-
cern an issue sufficiently substantial to justify certification. But see Conticommodity Servs., 
Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir. 1980) (substantial question existed concerning 
the scope of the district court's authority to hear the appellee's time-bar defense to arbitration). 
68. A further practical consideration supports the proposed distinction between orders 
granting stays and orders denying stays. A motion to stay arbitration can, of course, be made 
upon any grounds, no matter how frivolous. If orders denying stays were appealable, a party 
wishing to delay arbitration could enter a meritless motion to stay and appeal from its denial. 
If the trial court stayed arbitration during the pendency of the appeal, arbitration would be 
delayed. Holding orders denying stays unappealable thus tends to discourage purely frivolous 
or tactical appeals. In contrast, an order granting a stay of arbitration will generally constitute 
reliable-evidence that a substantial question is involved. Given the tendency of the federal 
courts to "resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration," see, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 
585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 
385 (24 Cir. 1961); Paul Allison, Inc., v. Minikin Storage of Omaha, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. 
Neb. 1979), a district court is unlikely to stay arbitration unless a serious question exists con-
cerning the validity or scope of the agreement to arbitrate. If the party seeking arbitration is 
making a claim which on its face is covered by the arbitration agreement, the agreement 
should be enforced. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 501 F.2d 
423, 427 (8th Cir. 1974); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 408 
F.2d 606, 609 (2d Cir. 1969); Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711, 714 (7th 
Cir. 1967). Permitting appeal of orders granting stays would thus provide for the immediate 
review of orders involving substantial issues and having potentially irreparable impact, The 
proposed distinction between grants and denials indeed seems to conform quite nicely to the 
policies behind both the final judgment rule and the Cohen collateral order doctrine. 
69. An objection can be raised, however, that the proposed rule would permit appeal of 
grants in some cases where there is no threat of irreparable injury, and would refuse appeal of 
denials in other cases where a threat does exist. This flaw in the rule cannot be denied. How-
ever, any rule that makes appealability tum on classes of orders will be flawed in this manner. 
To avoid this problem, it has been suggested that the courts of appeals employ a "balancing" 
process in deciding questions of appealability. Instead of holding broad classes of orders ap-
pealable, and others unappealable, the appellate courts would decide each petition for inter-
locutory review individually. The need for immediate review in the particular case would be 
weighed against the judicial system's interest in avoiding piecemeal review. See generally 
Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM, L. REV, 89 
(1975). Although the balancing approach would enable the courts to avoid injustice in particu-
lar cases, it is not a practical alternative. The need to review individually each petition for 
appeal would place an intolerable burden upon the circuit courts. Other disadvantages also 
counsel rejection of this proposal. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433,440 n.13 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
70. For the contrary conclusion that neither the grant nor the denial of a motion to stay 
arbitration is likely to cause irreparable harm, see Mathy, The Appealability ef JJistrict Court 
Orders Staying Court Proceedings Pending Arbitration, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 34, 66 (1979); Note, 
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rule thus constitutes a first step toward rationalizing the confused 
rules that currently control the interlocutory appealability of orders 
determining whether disputes should be arbitrated or litigated.71 
II 
Because the collateral order doctrine is not sufficiently broad to 
guarantee a right to appeal immediately all stays· of arbitration, a 
second step is also necessary. Some orders staying arbitration are 
not collateral to the merits of the case,72 and thus do not satisfy Co-
hen's first requirement.73 And appeal under the collateral order doc-
trine is discretionary. Particularly in circuits that strictly apply 
Cohen's importance requirement,74 some parties stayed from arbi-
trating may be unable to convince the court to accept their interlocu-
tory appeal. This Part takes that second step, arguing that section 
1292(a)(l) of the Judicial Code75 provides a right to appeal orders 
staying arbitration. As did Part I, however, this Part distinguishes 
between orders granting and denying stays and concludes that the 
latter are not immediately appealable.76 
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 373 (1961); Comment,Arbitration or 
Litigation? United Stales District Court Orders Resolving the Issue Should be Appealable under 
28 U.S.C § 1292, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 338, 347. The Illinois Comment concludes that both 
grants and denials should be held appealable under§ 1292(a)(l), and another commentator 
argues that all interlocutory orders determining arbitrability should be appealable. Note, supra 
note 53, at 295. 
71. Complex and seemingly inconsistent rules govern the area of interlocutory appeals of 
orders requesting stays of court proceedings. The grant of a motion under § 3 of the Arbitra-
tion Act for a stay of trial proceedings pending arbitration has substantially the same effect as 
the denial of a motion to stay arbitration. In either case tj:J.e party who loses on the motion will 
be under substantial pressure to arbitrate. See New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum 
Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 1972). Since the results of the two orders are the same, it 
follows that they should be governed by the same rules of appealability. But in fact, the ap-
pealability of a grant of a§ 3 stay under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) depends upon whether the 
claim sought to be litigated was legal or equitable in nature. This curious result is caused by 
application of the Enelow-Ettelson ru1e to orders requesting a s.taY of a court's own proceed-
ings. See note 88 iefra. Thus, even in circuits that deny interlocutory appeal of orders refusing 
stays of arbitration, the grant of a stay U!lder § 3 will sometimes be appealable. As the First 
Circuit stated, there are "medieval if not Byzantine peculiarities (in] this area of the law." 
New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 1972). 
72. See note 34 mpra. 
73. See note 29 mpra. · 
14. See notes 36-39 mpra and accompanying text. 
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) (1976). 
76. If orders granting stays are held appealable under§ 1292(a)(l), parties will not need to 
invoke Cohen. Recognition of a right to appeal under§ 1292(a)(l) would make the appeala-
bility of arbitration stay orders under Cohen irrelevant. Nonetheless, this Note.has discussed 
Cohen for two reasons. First, irreparable harm is a prerequisite to appealability under both 
Cohen and§ 1292(a)(l). Cases interpreting§ 1292(a)(l) frequently misapply the irreparable 
harm standard or neglect it altogether. A prior review of the concept of irreparable harm, as 
developed in the collateral order Cll5es, may help the reader to understand the sometimes con-
fusing decisions applying § 1292(a)(l). Second, holding the grant of a motion appealable and 
its denial unappealable poses no problem under Cohen. A grant/denial distinction of this kind, 
however, may conflict with the statutory language of§ 1292(a)(l). Courts that adopt the Sec-
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Section 1292(a)(l), which authorizes interlocutory appeal of dis-
trict court orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dis-
solving injunctions,"77 has created interpretative problems. Courts 
of appeals, unable to agree on the scope of the section, have adopted 
several conflicting positions concerning the appealability of rulings 
on motions to stay arbitration. Two circuits permit section 
1292(a)(l) appeals of both grants and denials of stays,78 one holds 
that neither grants nor denials of stays are immediately appealable, 79 
and another allows interlocutory appeal of grants but not denials of 
stays. so But this conflict is not irreconcilable. Tested against the 
standards that the Supreme Court has read into section 1292(a)(l), 
all but one of these interpretations fail. 
The Court set out the applicable standards most recently in Car-
son v. American Brands, Inc. ,81 which held appealable an interlocu-
ond Circuit's interpretation of§ 1292(a)(l), see text at notes 104-05 i'!fra, can still adopt the 
proposal in Part I of this Note. 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(I) (1976). See note 12 supra. The statutory exception to the final 
judgment rule embodied in § 1292(a)(l) was first established by the Evarts Act of 1891, ch, 
517, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828, which authorized interlocutory appeals "where ... an injunction 
shall be granted or continued by interlocutory order or decree." The various changes the 
statute has undergone since that time are recounted in Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 
U.S. 944 (1964). 
18. See Texaco, Inc., v. American Trading Transp. Co., 644 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Boeing-Vertol Co., 606 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1979); Shinto Ship-
ping Co. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., 572 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1978); Wickes Corp. v. Industrial 
Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974); Aerojet-General Corp. v. American Arbitra-
tion Assn., 478 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1973); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. International Union 
of United Rubber Workers, 476 F.2d 603 (5th Cir. 1973); Power Replacements, Inc., v. Air 
Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 
710 (9th Cir. 1968); Eastern Marine Corp. v. Fukuya Trading Co., 364 F.2d 80 (5th Cir,), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966). 
79. The Second Circuit denies appeal ofboth the grant and denial ofa stay. Diematic Mfg. 
Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); 
Aaacon Auto Trans., Inc., v. Ninfo, 490 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1974); Greater Continental Corp. v. 
Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970); Lummus Co. v. Ccmmonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 
F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
80. See Societe Generate de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European Mgt. & Sys. Co,, 643 
F.2d 863 (1st Cir. 1981); New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183 (1st 
Cir. 1972); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960), cert, 
denied, 364 U.S. 9II (1960). 
Several circuits that have considered only one aspect of the problem hold that grants of 
stays are appealable, Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 
(7th Cir. 1977); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 6II (7th Cir. 1973), revd. on other 
grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Medical Dev. Corp. v. Industrial Molding Corp., 479 F.2d 345 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (decision limited to facts of case), or that denials are not, Stateside Mach. Co, v. 
Alperin, 526 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1975); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 651 
F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1981); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). The Fourth Circuit took an appeal from an order granting a 
stay without giving explicit consideration to the issue of appealability. Leesona Corp. v. 
Cotwool Mfg., 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963). 
81. 450 U.S. 79 (1981). Carson is the Court's most cogent statement of the standards of 
appealability under§ 1292(a)(l). Other leading Supreme Court cases interpreting§ 1292(a)(I) 
include Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978); Switzerland Cheese 
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tory order of a district court that had refused to enter a consent 
decree providing for both preliminary and permanent injunctive re-
lief. 82 Briefly reviewing section 1292(a)(l)'s legislative history and 
its own prior decisions, the Court stated that the section creates "a 
limited exception to the final-judgment rule,"83 and concluded that 
only "orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence"84 are im-
mediately appealable.85 Despite the section's sweeping language,86 
therefore, it does not authorize interlocutory appeal of every order 
granting or refusing injunctive relief. 87 
To hold an order on a motion to stay arbitration appealable 
Assn. v. E. Home's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 
348 U.S. 176 (1955); and General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932). 
82. Carson involved a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The plaintiffs represented a class of present and former black employees who had 
worked for or applied for work with the defendant tobacco company. Alleging that the com-
pany had discriminated against the class in hiring, promotion, transfer, and training opportu-
nities, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief, and money damages. The parties negotiated a settlement prior to trial and jointly 
moved that the District Court approve and enter the proposed consent decree. 450 U.S. at 80-
8 l. 
83. 450 U.S. at 84. 
84. 450 U.S. at 84 (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 
(1955)). 
85. The Court found that the order denying approval of the consent decree in Carson 
posed two threats of serious or irreparable harm. First, refusal to enter the proposed consent 
decree would force the parties to go through "the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litiga-
tion." See note 95 infra. Second, plaintiffs had sought a preliminary injunction to restructure 
the defendant's tranfer and promotional policies. They asserted that without such immediate 
relief they would suffer irreparable harm. The district court's order thus threatened to cause 
the plaintiffs serious or irreparable harm by delaying the entry of preliminary injunctive relief. 
450 U.S. at 86-90. · 
86. See note 12 supra. 
87. Judicial definitions of an "injunction," outside the § 1292(a)(l) context, are surpris-
ingly scarce, and the Court in Carson failed to supply one. Generally, however, an "injunc-
tion" is a court order that commands or restrains conduct of the parties outside of the court 
proceedings. See, e.g., United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir. 1969) ("An 
mjunction is a prohibitive writ issued by a court of equity forbidding a party-defendant from 
certain action, or in the case of mandatory injunction, commanding positive action."); Western 
Union Tel. Co. v. Electrical Workers, Local 134, 133 F.2d 955, 957 (7th Cir. 1943) ("An in-
junction protects civil rights from irreparable injury, either by commanding acts to be done, or 
preventing their commission ..• "). 
Carson emphasizes that an order does not qualify as a§ 1292(a)(l) "injunction" merely 
because it commands or prohibits conduct outside of the court proceedings. In consequence, 
many orders that grant or refuse relief of an unquestionably injunctive character are not ap-
pealable as "injunctions" under § 1292(a)(l). Orders granting or refusing temporary re-
straining orders are perhaps the best-known example. A motion for a temporary restraining 
order requests the court to prohibit or command conduct outside of the court proceedings. 
However, the short duration of the orders lessens the likelihood that an order granting or 
refusing a temporary restraining order will cause irreparable harm. Immediate appeal of such 
orders might also impair the district court's ability to proceed promptly to an expanded hear-
ing on the request for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, orders granting or refusing tem-
porary restraining orders are generally held unappealable. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 
U.S. 61, 86 n.58 (1974); Sohappy v. Smith, 529 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1976); Drudge v. 
McKemon, 482 F.2d 1375, 1376 (4th Cir. 1973). Where the order on the motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order poses an unusual threat of irreparable harm, however, interlocutory 
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under the Carson interpretation of section 1292(a)(l), a court must 
find that the order grants or refuses injunctive relief, and that it 
threatens serious injury that cannot be corrected on a final judgment 
appeal. 88 The order need not, however, grant or refuse an injunction 
in express terms. 89 A motion to stay arbitration constitutes a request 
appeal may be permitted. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, FED· 
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3922, at 30-38 (1977). 
88. It is important to distinguish between stays of arbitration under§ 1292(a)(l) and the 
Enelow-Ettelson rule, which was developed by the Supreme Court in Enelow v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). The rule has been summarized as follows: 
An order staying or refusing to stay proceedings in the District Court is appealable under 
§ 1292(a)(l) only if (A) the action in which the order was made is an action which, before 
the fusion of law and equity, was by its nature an action at law; and (B) the stay was 
sought to permit the prior determination of some equitable defense or counterclaim. 
Jackson Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 303 F.2d 844, 845 (5th Cir.) (emphasis in original) (footnote 
omitted), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891 (1962). "The theory is that the stay, if sought of a law 
action, is analogous to a chancellor enjoining proceedings in the law court, a separate forum, 
whereas a stay of an equitable action represents merely an ordering of judicial business in a 
single proceeding in equity." Travel Consultants, Inc. v. Travel Management Corp., 367 F.2d 
334, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
rule in Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942), and in Baltimore Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955), even though the basis for the rule was destroyed in 
1938 when adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and equity. 
The rule fails to reflect existing realities and produces anomalous results. Arbitration is an 
equitable defense for purposes of the rule. Shanferoke Coal & Supply Co. v. Westchester Serv. 
Corp., 293 U.S. 449, 452 (1935). Therefore, while a motion to stay a legal action pending 
arbitration results in an interlocutory order appealable as the grant or refusal of an injunction, 
a motion for the stay of an equitable action pending arbitration does not give rise to an appeal-
able order. Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 483 (3rd Cir. 1975). In either case, 
however, the grant or refusal of the stay has the same effect upon the parties' interests. Given 
such results, it is not surprising that the Enelow-Ellelson rule has few friends. For judicial 
criticism of the rule, see Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1269 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Chapman v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 401 
F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1968). One court has boldly asserted that "[t]he demise of [the] rule 
cannot be far away," Hussain v. Bache & Co., 562 F.2d 1287, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but that 
seems to be an overstatement. For further criticism of the rule, see 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, 
E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 87, at § 3923. 
The courts of appeal have generally not applied the rule to orders granting or refusing stays 
of arbitration. Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1975). But see 
Whyte v. THinc Consulting Group Intl, 659 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1981). At least one com-
mentator is under the misapprehension that the rule should apply to arbitration stay orders. 
See Mathy, supra note 70, at 55-60. 
89. It is sufficient if the order has the practical effect of refusing the injunction. Carson v. 
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. at 83. Although the Court had approved the "practical" or 
"substantial effect" test many years earlier, see General Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 
287 U.S. 430, 433 (1932), speculation that the Court would abandon the test followed its deci-
sion in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978). See Note, The Limits 
oJ Section J 292(a)(J) Redefined?: Appealability oJ the Class .Determination as an Order "Refus-
ing an Injunction," 9 U. ToL. L. REV. 488, 511-14 (1978). 
The practical effect test is relevant in connection with the Enelow-Ellelson rule. See note 88 
supra. Where a court's stay of its own proceedings has the practical effect of denying a request 
for a preliminary injunction, the stay order will be appealable independent of the Enelow-
Ellelson rule. See, e.g., Gray Line Motor Tours, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 498 F.2d 293, 
298 (5th Cir. 1974); Glen Oaks Utils., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 
1960). Thus were a district court to grant a § 3 stay of its own proceedings, while at the same 
time failing to rule on the opposing party's request for a stay of arbitration, the stay order 
would be appealable as the refusal of an injunction, If orders denying stays of arbitration were 
otherwise held appealable under§ 1292(a)(l). 
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for injunctive relief because it asks the trial court to award substan-
tive relief involving an order of restraint.90 Motions to stay do not 
seek a mere practice order regulating the course of the court's own 
proceedings;91 rather, they ask the court "to exercise its equity pow-
ers to halt action of its litigants outside of its own court proceedings 
- the classic form of injunction."92 Both grants and denials of stays 
thus rule on a request for an injunction, .and satisfy the first prerequi-
site to appealability under section 1292(a)(l). 
Although the injunction requirement affords no ground for dis-
tinguishing between orders granting and denying stays, only orders 
staying arbitration threaten "serious, perhaps irreparable," harm 
that cannot be avoided in a final judgment appeal. As Part I docu-
mented, parties incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts pri-
marily to avoid the expense and delay of litigation.93 An order 
staying arbitration undermines a party's contractual right to resolve 
disputes quickly and inexpensively, and thus may cause irreparable 
injury.94 A court of appeals can, in a final judgment appeal, vacate 
90. See Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1975); Alberto-Culver 
Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1973), revd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. International Union of United Rubber Workers, 476 F.2d 603, 
604-05 (5th Cir. 1973); Bufller v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., 466 F.2d 694, 699 
(6th Cir. 1972); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1968). 
Many cases emphasize that an order must grant or refuse substantive relief to qualify as an 
"injunction" under § 1292(a){l). An order regulating matters of procedure, though cast in 
injunctive terms, is not an "injunction." See International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 
403,406 (2d Cir. 1963); 9 J. MooRE,supra note 18, at~ 110.10(1). Cf. Rodgers v. United States 
Steel Corp., 541 F.2d 365, 373 (3d Cir. 1976) ("An order incidental to a pending action that 
does not grant all or part of the ultimate injunctive relief sought by the claimant, that is unre-
lated to the substantive issues in the action and that merely continues the case is not appeala-
ble under section 1292(a)(l)."). Because an order staying arbitration grants injunctive relief 
and is related to substantive issues, it is appealable under this definition. 
One treatise defines § 1292(a)(l) "injunctions" as "orders that are directed to a party, en-
forceable by contempt, and designed to accord or protect 'some or all of the substantive relief 
sought by a complaint' in more than preliminary fashion." 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. 
COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 87, § 3922, at 29. Orders staying arbitration are directed 
at parties and are enforceable by contempt. They also afford relief "in more than preliminary 
fashion." The orders, therefore, qualify as injunctions under this second proposed definition. 
91. Whatever may once have been the attitude of the federal courts, it now seems settled 
that an arbitration panel constitutes a separate forum independent of the court itself. See 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956), disapproving Judge 
Learned Hand's statement in Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 383 (2d 
Cir. 1944), that "[a]rbitration is merely a form of trial, to be adopted in the action itself, in 
place of the trial at common law." In contrast, orders that merely control the conduct of 
litigation as a matter of procedure are generally held unappealable under§ 1292(a)(l). Orders 
commanding discovery, or regulating class action communications, for example, are not ap-
pealable. These orders do not grant any part of the substantive relief sought in the complaint, 
nor will they often pose a threat of harm sufficiently serious to justify a departure from the 
final judgment rule. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 
87, § 3922, at 38-42. 
92. A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1968). 
93. See text at notes 53-57 supra. 
94. See Bufller v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694, 698 (6th Cir. 
1972); New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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an erroneous stay and return to arbitration a dispute originally liti-
gated, but it cannot restore to the objecting party the time and 
money that he has expended to litigate the case. Serious impairment 
of the contractual rights of the party seeking to arbitrate can be 
avoided only by recognizing a right to appeal orders granting stays 
of arbitration immediately.95 An order denying a stay, however, 
does not threaten irreparable injury to the party desiring arbitration 
because arbitration proceeds without delay. Erroneous denial of a 
stay forces the party desiring litigation to incur some expense and 
delay, but does not infringe on any of his contractual rights. In light 
of the general rule that expense and delay, without more, do not 
constitute irreparable injury,96 it follows that the burden of partici-
pating in purposeless arbitration proceedings does not justify inter-
locutory appeal of orders denying stays.97 
This conclusion is at odds with the opinions of most of the courts 
of appeals that have considered the issue, but it is compelled by Car-
son's two-part inquiry. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that orders 
denying stays of arbitration are immediately appealable under sec-
tion 1292(a)(l),98 for example, seems incorrect because the court did 
not consider whether the denial of a stay threatened serious or irrep-
arable harm that could not be corrected in a final judgment appeal. 
95. Carson itself supports this conclusion. To explain why the district court's refusal to 
enter a consent decree might have "serious, perhaps irreparable consequence[s]," 450 U.S. at 
84 (quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955)), the Court ob-
served: "Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has 
produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues 
involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation," 
450 U.S at 86-87 (quoting United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,681 (1971)) (emphasis 
added). Parties waive their right to litigate and enter into arbitration agreements for the same 
reasons that the parties in Carson agreed to a consent decree - to avoid the expense and delay 
of litigation. 
There are, however, several differences between the consent decree and arbitration agree-
ment situations. First, the right to enter into a consent decree can be irretrievably lost through 
a denial of interlocutory review, but the right to arbitrate cannot be lost permanently. This 
difference is insignificant. Although the right to arbitrate cannot be irretrievably lost, post-
ponement of arbitration can eliminate most of the value of arbitration (i.e., mioimii:ation of 
delay and expense). Second, parties who enter into consent decrees know with certainty what 
their respective rights and liabilities will be when the court confirms the decree. In the arbitra-
tion context,"however, the dispute usually has not yet arisen when the agreement is reached, 
and the parties do not know m advance how the arbitrator will adjust their rights. But it is 
hard to see the relevance of the added certainty to the question whether a party is irreparably 
injured. · 
96. See note 40 supra. 
97. In the words of the First Circuit: 
A decision to stay impending arbitration may well be an injunction in the "classic" sense 
since it effectively deprives at least one of the parties to the dispute of one of the principal 
objects for which he has contracted - that IS, a relatively expeditious and inexpensive 
preliminary resolution of any controversy .... A refusal to stay arbitration, on tlie other 
hand, has no such potentially adverse impact on the ultimate rights of the parties. 
New England Power Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 186 (1st Cir. 1972) (foot-
note omitted). 
98. See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 1968). 
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The Fifth Circuit's identical conclusion99 is also based on an incom-
plete application of section 1292(a)(l)'s standard of appealability. 
The Second Circuit's position that neither grants nor denials of 
motions to stay are appealable under section 1292(a)(l)100 is simi-
larly suspect. To justify its position, the court argues that arbitration 
differs from court proceedings because it cannot produce an enforce-
able judgment without further judicial action. 101 The court may be 
suggesting that orders denying stays do not threaten irreparable in-
jury because arbitration awards can be judicially reviewed and re-
versed when confirmation is sought. This argument, however, only 
explains why' orders denying stays are unappealable: By their nature, 
erroneous orders granting stays are not correctable on a final judg-
ment appeal. The court's conclusion that interlocutory appeal of or-
ders denying stays would delay arbitration proceedings, 102 correct by 
itself, also does not justify rejecting appeals of orders granting 
stays.103 To reinforce these arguments, the Second Circuit claims 
that section 1292(a)(l) requires similar treatment of grants and deni-
als of stays.104 Although the statutory language supports this read-
ing, 105 the court's approach conflicts with the policies underlying the 
section. 
99. Wickes Corp. v. Industrial Financial Corp., 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974). 
100. See Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 516 F.2~ 975 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Aaacon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Ninfo, 490 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970); Lummus Co. v. Com-
monwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
101. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). The decision in Lummus has been criticized for the court's reli-
ance on the Enelow-Ettelson rule. See Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., 466 
F.2d 694, 697 n.4 (6th Cir. 1972); Comment, supra note 70, at 342-44. The Second Circuit has 
since expressly disavowed application of the Enelow-Ettelson rule to arbitration stay orders. 
Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1102 (2d Cir. 1970). 
102. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d at 86. 
103. q: Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694, 699 (6th 
Cir. 1972): 
If there are delays in arbitration which may accompany an appeal from an order deny-
ing a stay of arbitration, they do not appear to be as significant as the delays in arbitration 
wliich can result from the inability to appeal from an order granting a stay of arbitration. 
The District Court's order presently on appeal grants a preliminary injunction against 
arbitration which . . . could remain in effect through a trial on the merits of Buffler's 
antitrust, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Needless to say, we do 
not find that the delays in arbitration which may result from appeals from orders denying 
stays of arbitration warrant a rule that bars appeals from orders granting or denying such 
stays. 
( emphasis in original). 
104. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d at 86. 
105. Section 1292(a}(l) authorizes interlocutory appeal of orders granting or refusing in-
junctions, see note 12 supra, and provides no basis for distinguishing between orders granting 
and denying injunctions. 
It follows that the First Circuit's treatment of arbitration stay orders conflicts with a literal 
reading of the statutory language. See Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., 466 
F.2d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 1972). Indeed, one commentator states that "[t]he First Circuit's posi-
tion can hardly be deemed a logical construction of the statute." Comment, supra note 70, at 
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Congress did not enact section 1292(a)(l) to override the policies 
of the final judgment rule. 106 Rather, the section authorizes interloc-
utory appeal only of orders that threaten serious or irreparable harm 
that cannot be corrected in a final judgment appeal. Because only 
grants of stays threaten such harm, courts can effectuate the section's 
purpose by permitting appeal of grants, but not denials, of stays. 107 
It is significant, moreover, that while the courts have yet to establish 
a grant/denial distinction concerning any particular type of substan-
tive relief, 108 they have done so for at least one kind of procedural 
motion. 109 Courts should not be reluctant to extend this distinction 
346. Nonetheless, an insistence upon reading the statute literally in the present context would 
defeat the policies that § 1292(a)(l) seeks to promote. See text at notes 106-07 iefra. 
The courts can in fact be rather dogmatic in stating that grants and denials must be treated 
equivalently. See, e.g., United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1361 n.5 (5th Cir. 
1980) ("Since an order granting approval of a consent decree is one 'granting' an injunction for 
purposes of § 1292(a)(l), an order refusing approval of a consent decree is necessarily one 
'refusing' an injunction for purposes of§ 1292(a)(l), and is therefore appealable."). 
106. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). 
107. It seems obvious that courts will be truer to the congressional intent behind 
§ 1292(a)(l) if they interpret it with an eye to the policies behind it. As one court stated, when 
faced with a different issue of§ 1292(a)(l) appealability, "It is ... with reference to the policy 
underlying section 1292(a)(l) that this issue must be resolved." Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 367 
F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1966) (en bane). 
The argument that the effects of a grant are not equivalent to the effects of a denial has also 
been made with respect to orders granting or refusing class certification. See Note, Inter/ocu-
to,y Appea/ Under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(J) of Orders .Denying Class Action Cert!fication, 58 B.U. 
L. REV. 61, 75-76 (1978), contending that orders refusing but not orders granting class certifica-
tion should be appealable under§ 1292(a)(l). The Supreme Court has since held that an order 
denying class certification is not itself appealable. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 
437 U.S. 478 (1978). However, if the application for class certification is coupled with a re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, the denial of class status may be reviewed when interlocu-
tory appeal is taken of the ruling on the preliminary injunction. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 
F.2d 1231, 1236 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lombard, Sheriff v. 
Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). 
108. Of course, the First Circuit's position on arbitration stay orders is a start in that 
direction. 
109. A grant/denial distinction made by the courts in the context of certain motions for 
summary judgment successfully implements the policies underlying§ 1292(a)(l). A review of 
the leading decision, Switzerland Cheese Assn. v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966), 
makes this fact clear. In Switzerland Cheese, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in an action for solely permanent injunctive relief 
cannot be appealed as the refusal of an injunction under§ 1292(a)(l). Section 1292(a)(I), said 
the Court, is not intended to permit appeal of pretrial orders which decide nothing about the 
merits of the petitioner's claim. The rationale of the Court's decision is not difficult to see: 
When a trial court denies a plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, it does not finally deny 
the relief sought but instead only indicates that the claim must go to trial. The injunction the 
plaintiff seeks may well be granted when a final judgment is entered. The refusal to grant 
summary judgment therefore does not finally "refuse" the relief sought. q. Gardner v. West-
inghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478 (1978) (order denying class certification in action 
seeking solely permanent injunctive relief is not appealable under§ 1292(a)(I) because, among 
other factors, the order could be reviewed and reversed by the district court during trial pro-
ceedings). Equally important, a delay in granting permanent injunctive relief is unlikely to 
cause irreparable harm to the plaintiff. Permanent injunctive relief is generally issued only 
after a full trial on the merits. Chappel & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197,204 (2d Cir. 1966) (en 
bane). Thus, the plaintiff who requests only permanent, and not preliminary, injunctive relief 
is saying, in effect, that the right he seeks to assert will not be lost or impaired if relief is denied 
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to orders staying arbitration when to do so would point them toward 
a more rational approach to the interlocutory appealability of these 
orders. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal juditjal system protects the important policies re-
flected in the final judgment rule by restricting interlocutory appeal 
to orders threatening irreparable harm. Orders staying arbitration 
threaten irreparable harm because the expense and delay of litiga-
tion may frustrate a partys contractual right to arbitrate. A refusal 
to stay arbitration, however, poses no comparable threat of injury. 
Courts should, therefore, permit interlocutory appeal of grants but 
not refusals of stays of arbitration under either the collateral order 
doctrine or section 1292(a)(l). 
until the trial is concluded. For these reasons, the denial of a summary judgment motion such 
as that in Switzerland Cheese does not pose the "serious, perhaps irreparable" consequences 
that would make it appealable. In contrast, where the trial court grants the summary judg-
ment motion, the permanent injunction becomes immediately operative. Delaying appeal of 
the grant of summary judgment could, therefore, cause the enjoined party to suffer "serious, 
perhaps irreparable" harm for the duration of the trial. Accordingly, interlocutory orders 
granting a plaintiff's summary judgment motion for a permanent injunction are appealable. 
See, e.g., Guse v. J.C. Penney Co., 562 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1977); Ransburg Electro-Coating 
Corp. v. Lansdale Finishers, Inc., 484 F.2d 1037, 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally, 16 
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 87, at § 3924. 
The Switzerland Cheese summary judgment rule is not directly analogous to the problem of 
arbitration stay orders. As discussed above, an order denying a plaintiff's summary judgment 
motion for a permanent injunction does not constitute the district court's final determination 
of the relief requested. The order is, therefore, not one "refusing" an injunction. An order 
granting the motion, however, is a final determination and qualifies as an order "granting" an 
injunction. The ultimate issue of appealability, in other words, turns on the finality of the 
order involved. The problem of finality, however, does not arise in connection with arbitration 
stay orders. The order on a motion to stay arbitration undeniably is a final determination and 
thus constitutes an order "granting" or "refusing" relief. Instead, the central question is 
whether the relief granted or refused is an "injunction" within the meaning of the statute. The 
premise of this Note that a motion to stay arbitration is an "injunction" when granted, but not 
when refused, is thus distinguishable from the problem addressed in Switzerland Cheese. 
Nonetheless, Switzerland Cheese usefully illustrates that in certain contexts a grant/denial dis-
tinction effectuates the policies behind§ 1292(a)(l). 
